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SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE HISS CASE*
The Two-Witness Rule in Perjury Trials-Admissibility of Evidence
of a Crime Barred by the Statute of Limitations-
Secrecy of Jury Deliberations
On December 15, 1948, a Federal Grand Jury in New York indicted
Alger Hiss for the crime of perjury.' This indictment of Mr. Hiss
opened a new chapter in an already drama-filled controversy involving
two protagonists: Whittaker Chambers, self-confessed Communist, later
a senior editor of Time magazine, and Alger Hiss, former high State
Department official, later president of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. The trial following this indictment attracted as
much publicity as any other trial in recent history.2 Buried beneath the
avalanche of newspaper, magazine and radio reports were several impor-
tant legal issues. The legal bases of the Hiss trial were little noted in the
headlines; nevertheless, they raise some significant questions for the law-
yer. Quite apart from the guilt or innocence of the defendant, the trial
presented three unanswered legal problems. Fir'st, the two-witness re-
quirement in perjury cases was dramatically demonstrated, creating a
need for a re-evaluation of this requirement for a conviction of perjury.
Second, a question of policy regarding the Statute of Limitations was
ever-present in the shadows of the trial. Third, later repercussions of
the trial, particularly the press and public reaction to the "hung jury,"
underscored the deplorable lack of safeguards for the secrecy of the
jury room. Before examining these problems individually, a brief review
of the trial itself is necessary to focus these issues in proper perspective.
The Trial
The Hiss-Chambers controversy turns on Mr. Chambers' testimony
that during the late 1930's he worked as part of a Communist spy ring,
and that Mr. Hiss supplied him with secret State Department docu-
ments for transmission to Russia. In November, 1948, Mr. Chambers
produced microfilm copies of secret documents which he had hidden in
* Neither the author nor this Journal takes any position regarding either the guilt
or innocence of Mr. Hiss or the general question of the fairness with which the
trial was conducted. The only purpose of this comment is to highlight and discuss
certain legal questions which were raised during the course of the trial.
135 Stat. 1111 (1909), 18 USCA §231 (1927). A defendant convicted of perjury
may be fined up to $2,000, and imprisoned up to five years.
2 Judge Kaufman stated in his instructions to the jury: "This case has attracted
much public comment. Numerous accounts of this case, including editorial and
feature stories, have appeared in the public press, and it has been referred to over
the radio, and on television, by news commentators, news analysts, and others. You
would be more than human if you had been able to avoid all contact with some of the
articles in the press or to avoid hearing accounts over the radio. "' The instructions
then requested the jurors to discard "so far as is humanly possible" any consider-
ation of this publicity in their deliberations on the trial.
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a hollowed-out pumpkin on his Maryland farm. He claimed that these
were the documents which Mr. Hiss had given him. As a result of Mr.
Chambers' claims, a Federal Grand Jury in New York began an investi-
gation of possible violations of federal espionage laws. During this
investigation, Mr. Hiss was called as a witness. After his testimony,
the Grand Jury charged that Mr. Hiss "did unlawfully, knowingly and
wilfully, and contrary to... oath, state material matter which he did
not believe to be true."
Specifically, the Grand Jury indictment charged that Mr. Hiss had
perjured himself twice; first: by denying that he had ever given Mr.
Chambers any documents, and second, by denying that he had ever seen
Mr. Chambers after January 1, 1937.3 Possible indictment for the crime
of espionage4 was barred by the three year Statute of Limitations. 5
The trial began on May 31, 1949, and lasted until July 8, producing
a record of 735,250 words in more than 2,941 pages. Seventy-seven
witnesses gave their testimony. Climaxing the whole controversy, a jury
which deliberated for over thirteen hours ultimately announced that it
was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. One commentator has writ-
ten: "Of all possible outcomes of this generations' most celebrated trial,
a 'hung jury' was surely the one most in keeping with the general
bewilderment. It was the denouement that most accurately reflected the
prevalent doubt as to whether Alger Hiss was the victim of a personal
conspiracy or the perpetrator of a political one.''6
Underneath the pattern of "general bewilderment," the two conflict-
ing stories of the principal characters in the drama emerged fairly clear.
Mr. Chambers testified that he was introduced to Mr. Hiss by two other
'Communists in a Washington restaurant in 1934. After this introduc-
tion, Mr. Chambers claimed that he and Mr. Hiss became close friends
while both served as members of the Communist party. During 1937
and 1938, Mr. Chambers claimed that they were both engaged in espio-
nage, and that Mr. Hiss, then a State Department official, furnished him
with secret documents to be transmitted to a Russian agent, Colonel
Bykov. Mr. Chambers claimed also that he and his family had lived in
the Hiss apartment, in May, 1935, for about six weeks, when Mr. Hiss
became counsel for the Nye Committee, investigating the munitions
industry. Mr. Chambers admitted being a Communist party member
from 1924 to 1938, but claimed that he decided to leave the party in
1938 after pleading unsuccessfully with Mr. and Mrs. Hiss to join him
in resigning. To bear out the existence of relations with Mr. Hiss after
the crucial date of January 1, 1937, Mr. Chambers testified that the
Hisses had driven to a play in New Hampshire in August, 1937; that
Mr. Hiss loaned $400 to him sometime after November 19, 1937, to help
him buy a car; that he and Mrs. Chambers had visited the Hisses in
their home in December of 1937; that the 47 documents in issue were
all dated in the early months of 1938.
In sharp contrast to Mr. Chambers' testimony, Mr. Hiss claimed
that he had never at any time been a member of the Communist party,
and that he had never transmitted any restricted documents to Mr.
Chambers. Mr. Hiss testified that Mr. Chambers came to the Senate
s U.S. v. Alger Hiss, Criminal No. 128-402 (SXD.N.Y. 1949).
440 Stat. 217 (1917), 50 USCA §§31, 32 (1928).
5 42 Stat. 220 (1921), 18 USCA 5582 (1927).
6 Bendiner, The Trial of Alger Hiss: I (1949) Nation 52 (July 16, 1949).
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Munitions Committee in 1934 or 1935, when Mr. Hiss was there em-
ployed as counsel. He claimed that Mr. Chambers introduced himself
as "George Crosley," a free-lance magazine writer, and that he then
gave "Crosley" some material for a magazine article, as he did other
writers. Mr. Hiss admitted that he did sublet his apartment to "Cros-
ley," who at no time indicated that he was a Communist. However, he
claimed that he had completely severed relations with "Crosley" in
1936, when "Crosley" came to him requesting a small loan. Mr. Hiss
testified that he refused to make the loan because "Crosley" had never
repaid prior debts. He further denied making the $400 loan in Novem-
ber, 1937, to help Chambers buy a car; he also denied that the Cham-
bers' had been in his home in December, 1937. He further maintained
that he was in Chestertown, Maryland, on August 10, 1937, the date
on which Mr. Chambers asserted that they had driven to New Hamp-
shire. to see a play.
All other evidence adduced during the trial served either to corrobo-
rate or refute these two conflicting stories. Wives of the two principals
each testified in support of her husband; Mrs. Chambers filled in some
minute details of the furnishings in the Hiss home and some incidents
which occurred during the relationship of the two families. Mrs. Cham-
bers also substantiated her husband's testimony that the Chambers' had
been present at a New Year's Eve party in the Hiss home on December
31, 1937. Again in sharp contradiction, Mrs. Hiss denied any intimate
relationship with the Chambers', and insisted that the Chambers' had
not been present in the Hiss home at the 1937 New Year's Eve party.
Highlights of the other evidence included the actual introduction of
the government documents 7 which Mr. Chambers claimed came from Mr.
Hiss. All but four of the copies of the documents were typewritten,
while the remaining four were admittedly in Mr. Hiss's handwriting. A
surprise government witness was Henry Julian Wadleigh, a former State
Department economist, who freely admitted that he had given restricted
official documents to Mr. Chambers, but that none of the documents in
issue at the trial were the ones he had delivered.8 Other high points in
the trial were the appearances of distinguished character witnesses for
the defense. Two members of the Supreme Court, Justices Reed and
Frankfurter, personally testified to Mr. Hiss's integrity and veracity.9
Crucial defense witnesses were the past housekeeper for the Hiss's and
her sons. They testified that the Hiss's had given them an old Wood-
stock typewriter when they moved to another house in 1936. This was
the typewriter on which the prosecution contended that the official
documents were copied.
7 The documents were almost al in code, comprising 65 typewritten sheets, four
hand-written memoranda, and two rolls of microfilm. Collectively, these papers con-
tained a panorama of pre-war diplomatic moves by the United States in Europe and
the Far East. One document was considered so secret that it was withheld from the
Jury. N. Y. Times, June 2, 1949, p. 2, col. 3; N. Y. Times, June 15, 1949, p. 1, col. 1.
8 Mr. Chambers testified that he had five sources of information in Washington,
naming Mr. Hiss, Mr. Wadleigh, Mr. W. Pigman Reno, Mr. 11. D. White, and Mr.
Vincent Reno. N. Y. Times, June 10, 1949, p. 1, col 2.
9 Members of Congress have criticized the appearance of members of the Supreme
Court as witnesses in the Hiss trial. A bill has been introduced in the House of
Representatives which would bar federal jurists from serving as witnesses in future




Judge Kaufman's charge' 0 to the jury emphasized that the essential
issue of the case was the veracity of the two principal witnesses, Mr.
Hiss and Mr. Chambers. A part of the instructions follows: "The issue
... to be determined by the jury is in substance a very narrow one:
... Did the defendant willfully testify falsely when he stated... that
he did not furnish secret documents of the Government to Chambers in
February and March of 1938? ... If you find that the defendant did
not meet with Chambers on any of those occasions, you must also find
that he did not testify falsely... that he had not seen Chambers after
January 1, 1937.""1 Other parts of the charge stressed that the answer
to these questions depended upon the credibility of the two protagonists
in this vivid controversy.' 2
The Two-Witness Rule
Under the federal perjury "two witness" rule, the jury's decision as
to whether or not the defendant willfully testified falsely depended ulti-
mately on whether or not it believed Mr. Chambers' testimony. In his
opening statement to the jury, prosecutor Thomas G. Murphy remarked:
"If you don't believe Chambers, then we have no case." This statement
summarized the effect of the "two witness" rule in perjury trials. Act-
ually, the "two witness" title is a misnomer since the rule is satisfied
when the falsity of the statement made under oath is established by the
testimony of two independent witnesses or by one witness and corrob-
orating circumstances."8 In the Hiss trial, Mr. Chambers was the only
witness to testify directly that Mr. Hiss had transmitted the secret docu-
ments to him, and that he had seen Mr. Hiss after January 1, 1937.
Therefore, the rule would have been satisfied in the Hiss trial if the
jury had believed Mr. Chambers' testimony and believed corroborative
evidence of that testimony.
The law of evidence seldom requires a specified quantity of wit-
nesses, emphasizing rather the quality of the testimony of even a single
witness as being of sufficient weight to prove a fact in issue.14 The "two
witness" rule in perjury cases is therefore an exception' 5 to this general
doctrine; its explanation is largely historical. Dean Wigmore accounts
for this exception through two circumstances.' First, until 1640, per-
jury was dealt with exclusively by the Court of Star Chamber. The
Court of Star Chamber then followed the traditional ecclesiastical ruleof two witnesses to prove a point in issue. When the Star Chamber's
jurisdiction passed over to the King's Bench, the exceptional "two wit-
ness" requirement passed over, too, being adopted as a whole in the later
common law practice. Second, in early criminal cases, an accused could
10 The instructions comprised 28 typewritten pages, and were read by Judge Kauf-
man in fifty-seven minutes at the trial. Neither the prosecution nor the defense
objected to the instructions.
11 Judge Kaufman's charge to the jury, pp. 7, 8.
121,,... the credibility and veracity of Mr. Chambers and the weight to be given
to his testimony are crucial in this case, and one of the questions for you to deter-
mine is whether you believe Mr. Chambers' testimony beyond a reasonable, doubt."
Judge Kaufman's charge to the jury, p. 18.
18 7 Wigmuore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) §2040.
14 7 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) §2034.
15 A similar exception exists in proving treason, 7 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.
1940) §29036.
16 7 Wigmore, videne (3d ed. 1940) §§2040, 2041.
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not testify for himself, whereas in perjury trials, the accused was tradi-
tionally permitted to testify for himself. The courts argued, therefore,
that in non-perjury trials, "one oath for the prosecution was in any
case something as against nothing," while in a perjury trial, the defend-
ant's oath was also in evidence--consequently, if the prosecution offered
only one witness, it would merely be an "oath against an oath.' '17 The
"two witness" rule persisted through the 1700's, and was fully con-
frmed in England in the 19th century.'8
Severe criticism has been levied at the "two witness" rule. Critics
have pointed out that the "oath against oath" argument is unsatisfac-
tory in modern times because of the modern realization that all testi-
mony is not equally valuable, and that the testimony of one credible
witness may carry more weight than a dozen less reliable witnesses.' 9
Such criticism has been countered by attempts to justify the rule on pol-
icy grounds; defenders of the "two witness" requirement have argued
that a less stringent rule would increase the likelihood of false accusa-
tions of perjury by defeated litigants seeking revenge.20 The most
recent defense of the rule in this vein was in the United States Supreme
Court in 1945, when Mr. Justice Black, speaking for a unanimous court,
stated: "The crucial role of witnesses compelled to testify in trials at
law has impelled the law to grant them special considerations . ..
Since equally honest witnesses may well have differing recollections of
the same event, we cannot reject as wholly unreasonable the notion that
a conviction for perjury ought not to rest entirely upon an 'oath against
an oath.' The rule may have originally stemmed from quite different
reasoning, but implicit in its evolution and continued vitality has been
the fear that innocent witnesses might be unduly harassed or convicted
in perjury prosecutions if a.less stringent rule were adopted."'' s
These policy reasons appear to have little application to a ease like
the Hiss trial, where the defendant was on trial for perjury based on his
statements before a grand jury. In the Hiss case, the Federal Grand
Jury which indicted Mr. Hiss was investigating espionage activities.
The Grand Jury's indictment was based upon its belief that his answers
were falsely made when he appeared as a witness. In such a Grand Jury
investigation, there is no danger of defeated litigants, motivated by a
desire for revenge, pressing for perjury prosecutions. Likewise, there
is little danger of undue harassment of innocent witnesses when the
perjury indictment stems from testimony before a Grand Jury. There-
fore, it is submitted that there is sound basis for not applying the "two
witness" rule to a case like the Hiss case, since the policy reasons for
the rule have little validity in this situation.
Some states have completely rejected the "two witness" requirement,
holding that perjury can be proved by circumstantial evidence alone.22
In those states retaining the rule, and in the federal courts, the require-
ments of the original rule of two witnesses have been gradually relaxed.
17 Parker, C.J., in R. v. Muscot, 10 Mod. 192 (1714).
is The rule has now been codified in England in the Perjury Act, 1911, 1&2 Geo.
V., e. 6, §13, Public General Act, 1st & 2nd Geo. V., 1911.
19 7 Wigmore, Evidence, (3d ed. 1940) §2041. See Note (1941) 28 Va. L. Rev.
102, 103; Note (1945) Mich. L. Rev. 483, 484.
20 Best, Evidence (12th ed. 1922) §§6 05, 606.
21 Weiler v. U.S., 323 U.S. 606, 610 (1945).
22 State v. Storey, 148 Minn. 398, 182 N.W. 613 (1931) ; Marvel v. State, 33 Del.
110, 131 Ati. 317 (1925).
[Vol 40
CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS
It is now generally held that one witness will suffice if corroborated ;23
this was the rule applied in the Hiss case. No exact test has been laid
down as to the nature of the corroboration except that it must corrob-
orate the testimony of the single witness in some material particular.
24
Thus, in the Hiss trial, the jury was instructed that: "... . If you do
not believe the testimony of Mr. Chambers beyond a reasonable doubt,
the defendant must be acquitted; if you believe Chambers beyond a
reasonable doubt, but do not find that there is independent corrobora-
tion of the falsity of the alleged perjurious statement, the defendant
must be acquitted. If you believe the defendant, he must be acquitted;
if however, you believe Chambers' testimony beyond a reasonable doubt
... and that that testimony has been: corroborated, then you may find
the defendant guilty... 25
In the light of the so-called "two-witness" rule, Judge Kaufman's
instructions were correct. In recent years, there has been considerable
divergence of opinion regarding the desirability of maintaining the rule
in perjury trials.2 6 Complaints have been registered to the effect that
perjury is too difficult to prove under the present rule.27 The Hiss case
has called attention to the rule, provoking a re-examination and evalua-
tion of its policy defenses. As applied in the Hiss trial, the rule neces-
sarily centered attention on the credibility of Mr. Chambers, and away
from other independent evidence of the crime. The rule therefore placed
an extremely heavy burden on the prosecution to provide a reliable wit-
ness, since other weighty circumstantial evidence would be completely
disregarded if the jury did not believe Chambers' story.
Admission of Espionage Evidence
During the first few days of the trial, an issue of deep significance
was raised by a defense motion to exclude any evidence of espionage in
the trial for perjury.28 The prosecution had offered some evidence
regarding the alleged passage of the secret documents by Mr. Hiss to
Mr. Chambers; defense counsel then argued that such evidence was
inadmissible since it related to the commission of another crime, espion-
age.2 9 Since the crime of espionage has a three year Statute of Limita-
tions,2 0 prosecution for espionage had been barred.
The rule has been clearly established that in a criminal trial, evidence
28 Weiler v. U.S., 323 U.S. 606 (1945). Illinois also follows this majority view,
People v. Alkire, 321 Ill. 28, 151 N.E. 518 (1926).
24U.S. v. Hall, 44 F. 861 (S.D. Georgia 1890); Hashagen v. U.S., 169 Fed.
396 (C.C.A. 8th 1909).
25 Judge Kaufman's charge to the jury, p. 26.
26 7 Wigmore, Zoo. cit. supra, note 19.
27 Comment (1949) 39 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 629, 633 discusses proposed
Illinois legislation aimed at making it possible to convict for perjury by merely
alleging and proving contradictory statements made under oath, eliminating the
necessity of proving which statement is false. This proposal was aimed at removing
a present difficulty in proving perjury with the resulting "paucity of perjury con-
victions." See McLintock, What Happens to Perjurers (1940) 24 Minn. L. Rev.
727, 728; Note (1934) 24 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 951. However, this suggestion
would not help the prosecution in the Hiss case, since the defendant did not make
any contradictory statements in his testimony.
26 N. Y. Times, June 2, 1949, p. 1, col. 1.
29 40 Stat. 217 (1917), 50 USCA §§31, 32 (1928).
80 42 Stat. 220 (1921), 18 USCA §582 (1927).
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of other similar but unconnected crimes is inadmissible.3 ' Such evi-
dence is held inadmissible "not because it has no probative value, but
because it has too much." 82 Since the defendant is on trial for one
crime, the courts have argued that it would be prejudicial to allow
evidence of the commission of another crime in the same trial.38 How-
ever, the law has long drawn a distinction between evidence of similar
but unconnected crimes, and evidence of other crimes so connected with
the principal crime that the commission of the collateral crime tends
directly to prove the commission of the principal crime, or the existence
of any essential element of the principal crime.34 This latter type of
evidence is admissible, since without it, it would often be impossible to
prove the commission of the principal crime. Thus, when two crimes
are so intertwined that the proof of one may in effect also prove the
other, the courts have consistently held such proof to be admissible. One
judge has stated: "No man can by multiplying crimes diminish the
volume of testimony against him."85 Applying this to the Hiss case,
it follows that evidence of espionage activity would be admissible in the
trial for perjury, since such evidence would directly tend to prove the
alleged perjury.
However, when the crime so indirectly proved is barred by the Statute
of Limitations, as in the Hiss case, some serious questions of policy are
presented. The Statute of Limitations on crimes is aimed at protecting
individuals from tardy prosecution; it is based on a recognition of the
fact that time gradually wears out proof of innocence.86 Witnesses may
die, records may be lost-with the resulting loss of possible exoneration
of the defendant. To further this policy such statutes are generally con-
strued favorably for the accused. "7
Admitting evidence of espionage in a trial for perjury in the Hiss
case squarely collides with the policy of the Statute of Limitations. In
the Hiss case, the same facts would be in issue in a trial for espionage
as were in issue in the perjury trial. The same documents, the same
testimony, the same witnesses-all would be employed equally in prose-
cution of the two distinct crimes. Since identical proof would be re-
quired to convict for both crimes, the policy of the Statute of Limita-
tions would clearly be frustrated. The Hiss trial strikingly exhibited
the difficulty of proving either guilt or innocence based on events remote
in time. Few people are able to account for their actions ten to fifteen
years before trial. By prosecuting for a crime which is not outlawed by
the Statute of Limitations, though requiring the same proof as a crime
which is so outlawed, the purpose and policy of the Statute of Limita-
tions are effectively skited and circumvented. It may be thought that
the purpose of the Statute of Limitations is subordinate to the prose-
cution of a crime not barred by the statute even though it necessitates
811 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) §192. A leading case on this rule is People
v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 NE. 286 (1901).
32 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) §194.
88 1 Wigmore, Zoo. oit. supra note 31.
84 Banning v. U.S., 130 F. (2d) 330 (C.C.A 6th 1942) ; Minner v. U.S., 57 F. (2d)
506 (C.C.A. 10th 1932); Lovely v. U.S., 169 F. (2d) 386 (C.C.A. 4th 1948).
85 Brewer, J., quoted in 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) §216.
86 1 Wharton, Criminal Procedure (10th ed. 1896) §367.
87 People v. Ross, 325 Ill. 417, 156 N.E. 303 (1927) ; Rogoboom v. State, 120 Neb.




the use of the proof of a crime so barred. Whether or not this policy
decision is made in the future, the fact remains that in the Hiss case
more attention was focused on the evidentiary issue of espionage than
on the major legal issue of the trial-perjury. As a result of this mis-
placed emphasis, many people doubtless thought that Mr. Hiss was act-
ually on trial for espionage. Furthermore, from the standpoint of the
defendant's accountability for proof of his innocence, this was substan-
tially true.
Disclosure of Jury Deliberations
Reaction to the result of the Hiss trial was violent. The press,
88
members of Congress,3 9 and private individuals protested over the way
the the trial had been conducted. Charges of prejudice were made
against Judge Kaufman;40 some Representatives went so far as to de-
mand a Congressional probe of the case.4 1 Newspapers printed inter-
views with some of the jurors who claimed that the judge had been
biased for the defense.4 2 Some jurors disclosed what had happened in
the jury deliberations,43 and further announced which jurors had voted
for conviction, and which jurors had voted for acquittal.
44
Such disclosures are manifestly contrary to a strong policy in the law
protecting the secrecy of jury deliberations.45 It has long been recog-
nized that freedom of debate and discussion might be stultified if jurors
feared that their arguments and ballots were to be freely published to
the world.46 By granting a privilege against such disclosures on the
witness stand, the courts have established some measure of protection
against any disclosure of communications between jurors during retire-
ment. Thus, if a juror is called as a witness in a later trial, he cannot
testify as to communications with a fellow-juror in the jury room with-
out the fellow-juror's consent. The courts have rationalized this privi-
lege by arguing that such communications originate in a confidence built
upon secrecy, and this confidence is essential to the proper functioning
of the jury.4 8
Another implementation of this policy is found in Grand Jury prac-
tice. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide specifically that
the deliberations and votes of any juror in a Grand Jury are to be kept
secret.49 Grand Jurors take an oath of secrecy when they begin their
service as jurors.5 0 No Grand Juror can be required to disclose how
88 Chicago Daily Tribune, July 17, 1949, Editorial, p. 18.
39 95 Cong. Ree., July 12, 1949 at A4640; 95 Cong. Rec., July 13, at A4674, 9566.
40 95 Cong. Ree., July 18, 1949, at 9904-9915.
41 New York Times, July 10, 1949, p. 1, col. 4. For a contrary view, see remarks
of Representative Wayne Hays of Ohio, 95 Cong. Bee., July 14, 1949, at A4738-9.
42 New York Times, July 9, 1949, p. 1, col. 8; New York Herald Tribune, July 9,
1949, p. 1, col. 1.
45 Ibid.
44 One juror, James F. Harahan, made the following statement about the four
jurors who voted for acquittal: "(They) were so stubborn you could have knocked
their heads against the wall, and it would have made no difference. The foreman
was emotional, two were blockheads, and one was a dope. Eight of us pounded
the hell out of the four since Thursday night, but we couldn't get anywhere."
N. Y. Journal American, July 9, 1949, p. 1, col. 3.
45 8 Wigmore, Evidence, (3d ed. 1940) §2346.
46 See Clark v. U.S., 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
47 8 Wigmore, Zoo. oit. supra, note 45.
48 Ibid.
49 Rule 6(e), 18 USCA (Supp. 1948) following §687.
50 Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal (1st ed. 1947) 167.
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any juror voted, or what opinions were expressed in the deliberations
of that body, or to state in detail the evidence upon which the action
was had, or even to state whether or not an indictment was under con-
sideration.51 Such secrecy is to be maintained except when the court
permits disclosure.52 These restrictions are based on a concept of public
policy requiring that inquiries and proceedings before a Grand Jury are
private, and are not to be revealed to the general public.
53
No such protections of the secrecy of petit juries exist, other than the
privilege against disclosure on the witness stand. High speed mass com-
munication has heightened the dangers created by disclosure of jury
deliberations. Unpopular verdicts and unpopular votes can now be com-
municated quickly to the entire world. This is, of course, particularly
true in a case of wide public interest like the Hiss trial. Results of the
disclosure in the Hiss case are alarming. Some of the jurors who voted
for acquittal have reported threats made to them as a result of the
publication of the balloting.54 All of the jurors in the Hiss trial reported
receiving telephone calls and mail commenting on their stand.55 One
juror who voted for acquittal announced that he received a postcard
written in red ink, calling him a "sucker for the Communists" and
advising him to "go back to Russia.' 56
In the early development of jury trial, jurors were often fined and
imprisoned when they rendered a verdict contrary to the judge's view
of the case. 57 This treatment of the jury was ended by the land-
mark decision in Bushel's case in 1670.58 In this case, the jurors who
acquitted William Penn and William Mead on a charge of taking part
in an unlawful assembly were fined and imprisoned. However, they were
discharged on habeas corpus to the Court of Common Pleas, where Chief
Justice Vaughan pronounced that the jurors were the final judges of
fact, and were therefore not to be fined or imprisoned for their ver-
dicts.59
In the Hiss case, jurors have been exposed to threats and condemna-
tion when they voted for a verdict contrary to the beliefs of many
private citizens. Surely, such reaction will discourage future jurors in
this case from even taking part as jurors. It will discourage those who
do become jurors from exercising an independent judgment on the
merits of the case. The chances of a fair trial for both the defendant
and the prosecution have been substantially decreased by such dis-
closure. There is scant possibility that the jurors at the next Hiss trial
will remain unaffected by the treatment given the jury after the first
trial. Bushel's case has declared that members of a jury are to be kept
free from fines. and imprisonment when they render a verdict out of
keeping with the views of the judge. The Hiss case has spotlighted the
need for protection of present-day petit jurors from public threats, ridi-
51 8 Wigmore, Evidence, (3d ed. 1940) §§2360-2362.
52 Schmidt v. U.S., 115 F. (2d) 394 (C.C.A. 6th 1940); United States v. American
Medical Association, 26 F. Supp. 429 (Dist. Ct. D.C. 1939).
53 Orfield, loo. cit. supra, note 50.
54 N. Y. Times, July 23, 1949, p. 5, col. 6.
55 Liebling, The Wayward Press, (1949), New Yorker, p. 60 (July 23, 1949).
56 Ibid.
57 Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (1898), 166.
58 Vaughan, 134, 135. A good discussion of Bushel 's case is found in .Plucknett,
A Concise History of the Common Law (2d ed. 1936) 123, 124.
59 Ibid.
[Vol. 40
